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SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE
CONTRACTORS' STATE LICENSE LAW: AN
EQUITABLE DOCTRINE PRODUCING
INEQUITABLE RESULTS
I. INTRODUCTION
A licensed and bonded contractor was awarded a bid for con-
tractor services that resulted in the execution of a contract with a
property owner. During performance of the contract, the contractor's
license became due for renewal. The contractor timely submitted an
application for renewal with the appropriate fee. The State Contrac-
tors License Board received the application for renewal and ac-
knowledged timely receipt of the application. The contractor there-
fore assumed that its renewal application was being processed. Due
to backlog, however, the board did not process the contractor's li-
cense until more than nine months later. Worse yet, the renewal ap-
plication was then returned to the contractor for lack of a required
signature. Within twenty-four hours of learning of the rejection of its
application, the contractor flew to the board's Sacramento office
where a new renewal application form was signed and a new check
tendered. After curing the licensure lapse, the contractor continued
to satisfactorily perform all obligations under the contract. The con-
tract was near completion when a dispute arose between the con-
tractor and property owner regarding payment. The parties were un-
able to resolve their dispute and four years of litigation ensued.
On the eve of trial, the property owner requested an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether the contractor was duly licensed or,
alternatively, had substantially complied with the licensure law dur-
ing the performance of their contract. Following this hearing, the
contractor's claim was dismissed on the ground that the contractor
was negligent in failing to renew its license and in permitting the li-
cense to expire. This ruling was made despite the contractor's timely
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application for licensure renewal and good faith effort to cure the de-
fect after notification.
1
Under existing law, a contractor who brings a civil action to re-
cover compensation for the performance of contractor services must
allege that he or she was a licensed contractor at all times during the
2performance of the contract. Simply alleging proper licensure,
however, only allows a contractor who has suffered a licensure lapse
to maintain a cause of action so long as this allegation is not contro-
verted by the opposing party. If licensure is controverted, an evi-
dentiary hearing must be held to determine whether the contractor
was, in fact, licensed or had "substantially complied" with licensure
requirements under section 7031(d) of the California Business and
Professions Code.3 Section 7031(d) provides that the court may de-
termine substantial compliance with the licensing statute if the con-
tractor "(1) had been duly licensed as a contractor in this state prior
to the performance of the act or contract, (2) acted reasonably and in
good faith to maintain proper licensure, and (3) did not know or rea-
sonably should not have known that he or she was not duly li-
censed. '4
Although section 7031(d) appears to clearly define the circum-
stances that must exist in order for a contractor to invoke the sub-
stantial compliance exception, the confusing evolution of this doc-
trine has led many practitioners to question the proper scope of its
application. Prior to the amendment of section 7031 in 1989, the
courts created what has been commonly referred to as the "doctrine
of judicial substantial compliance." 5 The doctrine of judicial sub-
stantial compliance permitted "the judiciary to overlook the technical
1. See W. Coast Transfer Serv. Inc. v. Tutor-Saliba-Perini, J.V., LASC
No. BC 143376 (2000).
2. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7031 (West 1995).
3. See KENNETH C. GIBBS & GORDON HUNT, CALIFORNIA
CONsTRuCTION LAw 26 (16th ed. 2000). This evidentiary hearing is held pur-
suant to section 402 of the California Evidence Code which provides for an
evidentiary hearing to determine certain preliminary facts. See CAL. EVID.
CODE § 402 (West 1995).
4. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 703 1(d) (West 1995).
5. See Asdourian v. Araj, 38 Cal. 3d 276, 696 P.2d 95, 211 Cal. Rptr. 703
(1985); Knapp Dev. & Design v. Pal-Mal Properties, Ltd., 173 Cal. App. 3d
423, 219 Cal. Rptr. 44 (1985); Latipac, Inc. v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 278,
411 P.2d 564, 49 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1966).
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failure of a contractor to comply with section 7031 where the devia-
tion from the requirements of the statute is of little significance."
6
To reign in the liberality with which courts were invoking and ap-
plying judicial substantial compliance, the legislature amended sec-
tion 7031 in 1989 and added section (d), which states that "[t]he ju-
dicial doctrine of substantial compliance shall not apply to this
section." 7
In 1991, the legislature amended the contractors' licensing law
for a second time to resurrect substantial compliance, but only if it
was shown
at an evidentiary hearing that the person was a duly licensed
contractor during any portion of the 90 days immediately
preceding the performance of the act or contract; and the
person's category of licensure would have authorized the
performance of that act or contract; and that noncompliance
with the licensure requirement was a result of (1) inadver-
tent clerical error, or (2) other error or delay not caused by
the negligence of the person.8
This measure was encouraged by the increasingly widespread
belief that denying a contractor access "to the courts to collect le-
gitimate debts on completed work for the sole reason that he was un-
licensed at some point during the contractual period is a harsh and
potentially inequitable result."9 Thus, this amendment was "intended
to ensure that a contractor's ability to operate as a licensed contractor
is not jeopardized because of a technical error or oversight by the
contractor" in maintaining his or her license.' 0 Although this
6. Renee A. Mangini, The Contractors' State License Lmv: from Strict
Adherence to Substantial Compliance, 9 WHrrrER L. REv. 613, 620 (1987);
see Rodney Moss, Substantial Compliance with Contractor's Licensing Law,
L.A. LAW., July/Aug. 1986, at 49 (explaining that the concept of judicial sub-
stantial compliance "involves overlooking the technical failure to comply with
section 7031 where the deviation from the requirements of the statute are mi-
nor or of little consequence").
7. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 703 1(d) (West, WESTLAW through 1990
statutes annotated-historical).
8. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 703 1(d) (West, WESTLAW through 1992
statutes annotated-historical).
9. Mangini, supra note 6, at 616.
10. Committee Report for 1991 California Assembly Bill No. 1382, 1991-
92 Regular Session (June 24, 1991).
June 2001] 1541
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 34:1539
amendment resurrected the idea of substantial compliance, by 1994
the legislature believed that the scope of this measure was too limited
to carry out the purposes for which it was enacted and the exception
was amended for a third time in 1995.
The current doctrine of substantial compliance was enacted in
1995 to alleviate the severe consequences imposed on a contractor
who failed to strictly comply with the licensing statute."I The current
substantial compliance exception requires a contractor to prove that
he or she "(1) had been duly licensed as a contractor in this state
prior to the performance of the act or contract, (2) acted reasonably
and in good faith to maintain proper licensure, and (3) did not know
or reasonably should not have known that he or she was not duly li-
censed."' 12 Despite the legislature's effort to expand the doctrine of
substantial compliance, the current substantial compliance exception
to section 7031 does not advance the public policies supporting sec-
tion 7031 and, arguably, does not expand the scope of the 1991
amendment because both forms of the exception turn on whether the
contractor was negligent in maintaining his or her license.
The trial court's ruling in West Coast attests to the harsh penalty
suffered by contractors who have not rigidly adhered to the licensing
law and have inadvertently allowed their license to lapse. 13 The con-
sequence of failing to strictly adhere to the licensing law is "particu-
larly severe where the failure is essentially technical."' 14 West Coast
also illustrates the potential inequitable and harsh result imposed
against contractors under both the 1991 and 1995 amendments to the
substantial compliance doctrine and, consequently, exposes the leg-
islature's failed attempt to expand the scope of the current substantial
11. See Pac. Custom Pools, Inc. v. Turner Constr. Co., 79 Cal. App. 4th
1254, 1262, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 756, 761 (2000).
12. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7031(d) (West 1995).
13. The court noted that the 1989 amendment to section 7031(d) of the
California Business and Professions Code controlled in this case because that
version of the statute was in effect at the time the contract was entered into
between the contractor and owner. Reporters Transcript of Proceedings, April
19, 2000, pages 54-56.
14. Moss, supra note 6, at 49. The result in West Coast is particularly se-
vere because although the renewal application was technically defective for
lack of signature, the contractor had no control over the backlog causing the
California State License Board to process the renewal application more than
nine months after submission.
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compliance exception beyond that of its predecessor.' 5 As a result,
property owners are still permitted to not only breach an agreement
with a contractor licensed at the time of contract formation with im-
punity, but also to become unjustly enriched at the hands of the law.
This Comment will expand upon these, and other, shortcomings of
the current substantial compliance doctrine.
First, the legislature's purpose in enacting a contractors' licens-
ing law and the public policies which support the law are discussed.
Next, the statutory and common law evolution of the substantial
compliance doctrine is reviewed. Lastly, this Comment illustrates
the deficiencies of the statutory substantial compliance doctrine and
explains the reasons why a return to the doctrine of judicial substan-
tial compliance is preferable to the current legislative formulation.
II. THE PUBLIC POLICIES SUPPORTING THE LICENSING LAW AND THE
COMMON LAW RATIONALE FOR PRECLUDING UNLICENSED
CONTRACTORS FROM RECOVERING ON CONTRACT
The California legislature enacted the Contractors' State License
Law in 193916 for the purpose of protecting "the health, safety, and
general welfare of the public."'17 Specifically, the licensing law pro-
tects "the public from incompetence and dishonesty in those who
provide building and construction services" and provides "minimal
assurance that all persons offering such services in California have
the requisite skill and character, understand applicable local laws and
codes, and know the rudiments of administering a contracting busi-
ness.' ' 18 The licensing law accomplishes its purpose by requiring ap-
plicants to show general knowledge of the administrative principles
of the contracting business. Applicants must be "knowledgeable of
any California building, safety, health and lien laws which may be
15. The court ruled that even if the 1991 or 1995 amendments to the Busi-
ness and Professions Code were to control in this case, the contractor did not
substantially comply with the meaning of either of these two versions of the
section. Reporters Transcript of Proceedings, April 19, 2000, pages 54-56.
16. See Robert W. Sickels, New Interpretations of California's Contrac-
tors'License Law, 1 U.S.F. L. REV. 298, 298 (1967).
17. Mangini, supra note 6, at 615.
18. Pac. Custom Pools, Inc. v. Turner Constr. Co., 79 Cal. App. 4th 1254,
1260, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 756, 760 (2000).
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'necessary for the safety and protection of the public"' before the
state will issue a license.
19
The licensing statute was designed to provide an incentive for
contractors to procure a license in that section 7031 precludes unli-
censed contractors from using the courts to enforce contracts which
contractors have entered into in an unlicensed status.20 "The obvi-
ous statutory intent is to discourage persons who have failed to com-
ply with the licensing law from offering or providing their unlicensed
services for pay."
21
At the time the legislature enacted section 7031, however, the
novelty of this sanction and the incentive created to procure a license
was illusory in light of the illegal nature of such contracts22 and the
well-established principle that a court of law will not enforce an ille-
gal contract or the rights arising out of an illegal transaction.2' The
enactment of section 7031 rendered a judicial determination on the
legality of a contract for which a license was required unnecessary.
"Rather than finding that a contract is illegal due to lack of a license,
and applying the rule that illegal contracts are void and unenforce-
able, the court may simply look to the statute which provides 'no li-
cense, no pay.'
24
Although the courts refused to aid in the enforcement of an ille-
gal contract, they have been fully aware of the injustice which may
19. Mangini, supra note 6, at 616 (quoting CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §
7068(a) (West 1995)).
20. See Knapp Dev. & Design v. Pal-Mal Properties, Ltd., 173 Cal. App. 3d
423, 432, 219 Cal. Rptr. 44, 48 (1985) ("The absence of a license at the time of
contracting has figured prominently in cases denying recovery due to lack of
substantial compliance."); see also CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7031 (West,
WESTLAW through 1989 statutes annotated-historical) (precluding unlicensed
contractors from recovering compensation).
21. Hydrotech Sys., Ltd. v. Oasis Waterpark, 52 Cal. 3d 988, 995, 803 P.2d
370, 374, 277 Cal. Rptr. 517, 521 (1991).
22. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7028(a) (West 1995) ("It is a misde-
meanor for any person to engage in the business or act in the capacity of a
contractor within this state without having a license therefor, unless such per-
son is particularly exempted from the provisions of this chapter.").
23. See Wise v. Radis, 74 Cal. App. 765, 775, 242 P. 90, 94 (1925) ("No
principle of law is better settled than that a party to an illegal contract or an il-
legal transaction cannot come into a court of law and ask it to carry out the il-
legal contract or to enforce rights arising out of the illegal transaction.").
24. Mangini, supra note 6, at 618.
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result between the parties. It is well established that the contractors'
licensing law "represents a legislative determination that the impor-
tance of deterring unlicensed persons from engaging in the contract-
ing business outweighs any harshness between the parties, and that
such deterrence can best be realized by denying violators the right to
maintain any action for compensation in the courts of the state. ,25
Despite the greater public interest in promoting health, safety, and
the deterrence of illegal conduct, the courts could not escape the in-
equities resulting from strict enforcement of the licensing statute.
"The courts have enforced this statute with some reluctance, since
strict enforcement may cause an unconscionable forfeiture that is not
well fitted to the gravity of the offense.'
26
Another reason for abandoning strict adherence is the inconsis-
tent reasoning supporting the statute. For example, it does not neces-
sarily follow that an unlicensed contractor does not have the requisite
skill and knowledge to perform competently without jeopardizing the
health and safety of the public. Accordingly, it did not take the judi-
ciary long to realize that qualified and skilled contractors were being
denied compensation for legitimate debts under the statute simply
because they were unlicensed. The California Supreme Court recog-
nized that strict enforcement of the licensing law was not necessary
to satisfy the legislative intent of section 7031 and the trend in con-
struing section 7031 slowly changed from one of strict adherence to
substantial compliance.
III. To BE OR NOT To BE: THE CONFUSING EVOLUTION AND
CONFLICTED DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE
DOCTRINE UNDER SECTION 7031
A. The Transition from Strict Adherence to Substantial Compliance
In 1946, only seven years after the enactment of section 7031,
the California Supreme Court recognized the potential inequity that
resulted from an unnecessarily strict construction of section 703 1.27
25. JAMES ACRET, CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION LAW MANUAL § 4.05, at
224 (5th ed. 1997).
26. Id. at 223.
27. See Gatti v. Highland Park Builders Inc., 27 Cal. 2d 687, 166 P.2d 265
(1946).
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It was not until 1966, however, that the California Supreme Court in
Latipac, Inc. v. Superior Court2 8 set the parameters for judicial sub-
stantial compliance by setting forth three requisite elements for the
application of the doctrine. The Latipac court held that the contrac-
tor must hold a valid license at the time of contracting, a renewal of
the license must be readily secured, and the responsibility and com-
petence of the contractor's managing officer must be officially con-
firmed throughout performance of the contract if the doctrine of sub-
stantial compliance is to be applied.29
With regard to the first element, the court held that a contractor
holding a valid license at the time of contract formation executes a
contract valid at its inception and that the possession of a valid li-
cense substantiates the contractor's ability to perform the various oc-
cupational undertakings.30 The Latipac court held that "[t]he key
moment of time when the existence of the license becomes determi-
native is the time when the other party to the agreement must decide
whether the contractor possesses the requisite responsibility and
competence and whether he should, in the first instance, enter into
the relationship.' It is during this period of contract formation that
"[t]he license, as an official confirmation of the contractor's respon-
sibility and experience, then plays its important role.",32 Thus, the
court held that a contractor who successfully, although belatedly, se-
cures renewal of a license that it held at the inception of the contract
will be accorded proper deference in ascertaining whether the policy
of the statute has been satisfied.33
The second element, an immediate renewal of the license, fur-
ther attests to the contractor's continued competence throughout per-
formance of the contract and its good faith in seeking reinstatement.
In Latipac, the contractor explained that it assigned the responsibility
for renewing the license to its office manager, and that the manager
suffered an emotional breakdown and was subsequently committed
to a mental institution which made timely detection of the licensure
28. 64 Cal. 2d 278, 411 P.2d 564, 49 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1966).
29. See id. at 281-82, 411 P.2d at 567-68, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 679-80.
30. See id. at 282, 411 P.2d at 568, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 679.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See Latipac, 64 Cal. 2d at 283, 411 P.2d at 569, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 681.
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lapse difficult.34 As a result, the contractor performed services under
the contract after the license had expired for approximately ten
months.35 The license was not renewed until two months after con-
tract completion.
6
Despite this untimely renewal, the Latipac court held that it may
afford significance to the renewal in determining whether the policy
of the statute had been satisfied so long as there was no "indication
that plaintiffs fitness to enjoy a license fluctuated between the expi-
ration and renewal of its license."37 The court was not presented
with any evidence suggesting that plaintiffs competence or respon-
sibility were impaired during the period following the licensure
lapse, so, accordingly, this element of the three-prong test was satis-
fied.
Lastly, the verification of the competence and responsibility of
the contractor's managing officer was considered fundamental to a
"legislative determination that the fitness of a corporation to enjoy a
contractor's license lies in the competence and experience of the in-
dividual who qualifies on its behalf.' 38  The office manager in
Latipac functioned as a qualifier for a number of other corporations.
39 The court looked to the valid contractors' licenses held by these
other corporations during the period of contract performance in the
present case as evidence of the office manager's experience and
34. See id. at 281, 411 P.2d at 567, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 679.
35. See id. at 280,411 P.2d at 567,49 Cal. Rptr. at 679.
36. See id.
37. Id. at 284, 411 P.2d at 569, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 681.
38. Id. at 285, 411 P.2d at 570, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 682.
39. If a corporation applies for a contractor's license, the corporation must
qualify through either a responsible managing officer (RMO) or responsible
managing employee (RME) who is qualified in the licensing classification for
which the corporation is applying. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7068(b)(3)
(West 1995). The RMO or RME must be a bona fide officer or employee of
the corporation and must be actively engaged in the work covered by the li-
cense. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7068(d) (,Vest 1995). Under regula-
tions promulgated by the Contractor's State License Board, a "bona fide" em-
ployee is an "employee who is permanently employed by the applicant and is
actively engaged in the operation of the applicant's contracting business for at
least 32 hours or 80% of the total hours per week such business is in operation,
whichever is less." CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 16, § 823(a) (1984). The qualifier
must also exercise direct supervision over the work for which the license is is-
sued to the extent necessary to secure full compliance with the provisions of
the license law. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7068.1 (West 1995).
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case as evidence of the office manager's experience and competence
in its consideration of the contractor's license renewal application.
Since all three requisite elements were present in Latipac, the court
refrained from determining "whether any of them, singly or in more
limited combination, would constitute 'substantial compliance."'
'A
Following the Latipac decision, the trend to liberally expand the
application of substantial compliance continued so long as the pur-
pose of the licensing law had been satisfied. The invocation of sub-
stantial compliance became "appropriate where despite some failure
of literal compliance with the licensing requirements 'the party
seeking to escape his obligation has received the full protection
which the statute contemplates. ' '"1  This policy was further evi-
denced in the 1979 case of Brown v. Solano County Business Devel-
opment, Inc.42 There the court held that the objective of protecting
the public from dishonest, incompetent, and financially irresponsible
contractors was not fulfilled merely because the contractor possessed
a license at the time of contracting and for a brief period during per-
formance. 43
An increasingly liberal interpretation of the substantial compli-
ance doctrine continued into the 1980s when the California Supreme
Court in Asdourian v. Ara]j4 held that a failure to satisfy all three of
the requisite elements introduced in Latipac would not contravene a
contractor's claim so long as the contractor had substantially com-
plied with the state licensing law in a way which satisfied the legis-
lative policy.45 In the same year, Knapp Development & Design v.
Pal-Mal Properties, Ltd.46 held that the applicability of the substan-
tial compliance doctrine hinged upon whether the contractor could
40. Latipac, 64 Cal. 2d at 281, 411 P.2d at 567, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 679. But
see Lewis v. Arboles Dev. Co., 8 Cal. App. 3d 812, 87 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1970)
(holding that all three elements of Latipac need not be present in order to con-
stitute substantial compliance where the contractor made no showing that the
contractor readily secured renewal of its expired license).
41. Weeks v. Merritt Bldg. & Constr. Co., 39 Cal. App. 3d 520, 524-25,
114 Cal. Rptr. 209, 212 (1974).
42. 92 Cal. App. 3d 192, 154 Cal. Rptr. 700 (1979).
43. See id.
44. 38 Cal. 3d 276, 696 P.2d 95, 211 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1985).
45. See id. at 284, 696 P.2d at 100, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
46. 173 Cal. App. 3d 423, 219 Cal. Rptr. 44 (1985).
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establish that the contractor's managing officer was competent and
responsible throughout the performance of the contract.
47
Consequently, despite the strong public policies underlying en-
forcement of section 7031 and the illegal nature of contracts exe-
cuted by unlicensed contractors, the foregoing authorities illustrate
the degree of liberality exercised by the courts in applying section
7031. The courts applied section 7031 flexibly to achieve equitable
results while also being careful not to compromise the ultimate pur-
pose of the statute in protecting the public from incompetent and ir-
responsible contractors. In 1989, however, the application of sub-
stantial compliance was put to an end when section 7031 was
amended and the judicial doctrine was eliminated.
B. The Legislature Eliminates the Doctrine ofJudicial Substantial
Compliance
After the 1989 amendment to section 7031, adding subsection
(d), which provided that "[t]he judicial doctrine of substantial com-
pliance shall not apply under this section, 48 it soon became apparent
that contractors must strictly adhere to the licensing statute and make
certain that they are properly licensed throughout the course of per-
formance if they have any hope of using the court system to recover
amounts they contend are due to them.
In Hydrotech Systems, Ltd. v. Oasis Waterpark,49 the first case
interpreting section 7031 after the 1989 amendment, the California
Supreme Court held that section 7031 bars not only contract actions
47. See id. at 434, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 50. The Contractors' State License
Law was technically violated, but the policy of the lawv was not violated since
the responsible managing officer's license sufficiently ensured responsible and
competent performance.
48. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 703 1(d) (West, VESTLAV through 1990
statutes annotated-historical).
49. 52 Cal. 3d 988, 803 P.2d 370,277 Cal. Rptr. 517 (1991).
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by unlicensed contractors, but tort actions for fraud as well.50 In its
ruling, the court stated:
Regardless of the equities, section 7031 bars all actions,
however they are characterized, which effectively seek
compensation for illegal unlicensed contract work . ... It
follows that an unlicensed contractor may not circumvent
the clear provisions and purposes of section 7031 simply by
alleging that when the illegal contract was made, the other
party had no intention of performing. Section 7031 places
the risk of such bad faith squarely on the unlicensed con-
tractor's shoulders. Knowing that they will receive no help
from the courts and must trust completely to each other's
good faith, the parties are less likely to enter into an illegal
arrangement in the first place.
5 1
C. The Legislature Reinvents a Narrow Substantial Compliance
Exception to Section 7031
In 1991, the legislature amended section 7031(d) to provide for
a very narrow substantial compliance exception if it was shown
at an evidentiary hearing that the person was a duly licensed
contractor during any portion of the 90 days immediately
preceding the performance of the act or contract... [and]
that the person's category of licensure would have author-
ized the performance of that act or contract, and that non-
compliance with the licensure requirement was a result of
(1) inadvertent clerical error, or (2) other error or delay not
caused by the negligence of the person.
5 2
In Construction Financial LLC v. Perlite Plastering Co., 53 sec-
tion 7031(d) was interpreted for the first time after the 1991
50. See id. at 999, 803 P.2d at 376-77, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 523-24 (stating that
the "deterrent and protective purposes of section 7031 preclude recovery even
when the person who solicited the unlicensed work did act in bad faith") (em-
phasis added).
51. Id. at 997-98, 803 P.2d at 376, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 523 (emphasis added).
52. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7031(d) (West, WESTLAW through 1992
statutes annotated-historical).
53. 53 Cal. App. 4th 170, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 574 (1997).
1550
CONTRACTORS' LICENSING LAW 15
amendment.5 4 In that case, Diversified Gypsum Corporation was
formed to do subcontract work for Perlite Plastering Company, Inc.
One of the principals of Diversified held a specialty license in dry-
wall and, on the advice of Perlite, Diversified did not apply for spe-
cialty licenses or designate their license-holding principal as the re-
sponsible managing operator.5 5 Instead, Diversified applied for and
obtained a general contractor's license through a long-time employee
of Perlite, who went to work for Diversified as a foreman and its
RME. Thus, Diversified held a general contractor's license. The
RME worked for Diversified for several months until he was either
fired-as the RMIE understood matters--or it was suggested that he
take a long-term leave of absence to deal with certain health and
family matters-as Diversified's principal understood matters.
Shortly after the RME's departure, Diversified commenced work un-
der a subcontract with Perlite to install drywall. The project was
scheduled for completion on November 25, 1992, but was not com-
pleted until September 9, 1993. As a result of the delay, Diversified
brought suit against Perlite and the general contractor's payment
bond claiming damages in excess of $800,000.56
The case proceeded to a bifurcated trial on the issue of whether
Diversified held a valid contractor's license at the time it performed
the work sued upon; or if not, whether Diversified substantially
complied with the licensing requirement. The trial court found that
because Diversified's RME was no longer employed by Diversified
when it commenced work on the project, Diversified did not have a
valid contractor's license of any kind when it performed the work.
In spite of the fact that the principal's specialty licenses would have
authorized the work had those licenses been held by Diversified, the
54. In Construction Financial, the trial court decided that the 1991 amend-
ment controlled because this action was commenced on December 20, 1993.
See id. at 178 n.3, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 578 n.3. Section 7031(e)(1) provides that
the "amendments to subdivisions (d) and (e) enacted during 1994 portion of
the 1993-1994 Regular Session of the Legislature shall not apply to ... [a]ny
legal action or arbitration commenced prior to January 1, 1995, regardless of
the date on which the parties entered into the contract." CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE § 703 1(e)(1) (West 1995).
55. See Construction Financial, 53 Cal. App. 4th at 173-74, 61 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 575-76.
56. See id. at 174, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 575-76.
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trial court held that Diversified did not have a license authorizing its
work on the project. The court based its holding on the fact that sec-
tion 7031 precluded Diversified from recovering against the bonding
company unless it could prove substantial compliance.
5 7
Diversified argued that it should not have been denied recovery
because the legislative purpose of the licensing law was carried out
at all times during performance to the extent that Diversified's prin-
cipal was at all times a licensed drywall contractor. While suggest-
ing in dicta that this argument would be successful if the case was
still governed by the judicial doctrine of substantial compliance, the
court affirmed the trial court's ruling that Diversified's negligence
caused its noncompliance with the licensing law.58  Diversified
should have known that the departure of their RME also meant the
departure of their license.
59
In response to Diversified's argument that they relied on Per-
lite's representation that they need not procure any specialty licenses,
the court revisited the holding in Hydrotech60 which states that sec-
tion 7031 applies even when the person for whom the work was done
knew that the contractor was unlicensed.61 The court stated that
"[t]he Supreme Court has also held that a contractor may not plead
reliance upon another person in determining what is required under
the Law; unlicensed contractors are held to knowledge of the Law's
requirements."
62
After the court's decision in Construction Financial, substantial
compliance with the licensing law was to be recognized in situations
"where a person lacks licensure due to an error beyond his or her
control 63 and situations "in which nonlicensure would not be attrib-
utable to a contractor's negligence." 64  Notwithstanding this lip
57. See id. at 175, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 575.
58. See id. at 184, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 582.
59. See id.
60. Hydrotech Sys., Ltd. v. Oasis Waterpark, 52 Cal. 3d 988, 803 P.2d 370,
277 Cal. Rptr. 517 (1991).
61. See id. at 997, 803 P.2d at 376, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 523.
62. Construction Financial, 53 Cal. App. 4th at 181, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
580.
63. Id. at 183, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 581.
64. Id. at 184, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 582 (emphasis in original). The court
presented the factual scenario in which a contractor mails a timely renewal ap-
plication and fee and begins work on a new project assuming that there would
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service to the doctrine of substantial compliance, the courts made it
patently clear that the importance of deterring unlicensed persons
from engaging in the construction contracting business outweighs
any harshness of the result, regardless of whether the unlicensed
contractor suffered a breach of contract or was even the victim of
fraud. Even fraud in the inducement did not get the contractor in
Hydrotech around the bar of section 7031. It is therefore clear that
the lack of a license operates as a complete defense to any claim by
an unlicensed contractor to recover compensation whether based on
contract, unjust enrichment, or even fraud.
D. The Legislature Attempts to Expand the Doctrine of Substantial
Compliance to Alleviate the Overly Harsh Consequences of Strict
Adherence
In 1994, the legislature reinvented the doctrine of substantial
compliance to "remove the overly harsh application of the Contrac-
tors' State License Law which in court actions denies contractors
payment for services rendered when for clerical or otherwise minor
errors they become unlicensed during the term of a contract."6 Ac-
cordingly, the legislature amended section 7031 and set forth three
new requirements for establishing statutory substantial compliance.
It now must be shown at an evidentiary hearing that the person acting
in the capacity of a contractor
(1) had been duly licensed as a contractor in this state prior
to the performance of the act or contract, (2) acted reasona-
bly and in good faith to maintain proper licensure, and (3)
did not know or reasonably should not have known that he
or she was not duly licensed.66
be no problem with his or her application and that the application would be
processed. However, if the renewal application were lost in the mail, or for
any number of reasons beyond the contractor's control was not processed be-
fore the expiration of the contractor's license, the contractor may be unlicensed
while performing the work. The contractor has not been negligent in this
situation. See id.
65. Senate Rules Committee Report for 1993 Senate Bill No. 1844, 1993-
94 Regular Session (Aug. 18, 1994).
66. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 703 1(d) (West 1995).
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The application of these three elements is illustrated in Pacific Cus-
tom Pools, Inc. v. Turner Construction Co.
67
In Pacific Custom Pools, a subcontractor's claim for compensa-
tion was dismissed, although the contractor was licensed before
commencing work on the project, because its license became sus-
pendedp8ursuant to California Business and Professions Code section
7071.6. The contracting company's president submitted affidavits
in opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment stating
that he was unaware of the license suspension. The contracting
company's president was unaware of the licensure suspension be-
cause the president was unaware of the judgment entered against the
contracting company which triggered the suspension. The materials
supplier obtained a judgment against the contracting company be-
cause, unbeknownst to the contracting company, its bonding com-
pany had filed for bankruptcy.69 During the period in which the
contractor's license was suspended, the contractor received a license
renewal application from the California State Licensing Board ad-
vising the contractor fourteen months in advance of the license expi-
ration date and stating that "[a] license cannot be renewed active
while under suspension." 70 Approximately one month after the con-
tractor's license expired, the board contacted the contractor to inform
it that the contractor's renewal application was untimely and that its
license was still suspended. 71 Twenty days later, the board notified
the contractor that the suspension had been lifted but that the license
had expired.72 Approximately one month later, the board notified the
contractor that its renewal application was not processed and that the
67. 79 Cal. App. 4th 1254, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 756 (2000).
68. See id. at 1257-59, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 758-59. Section 7071.6 "re-
quired a licensee to notify the registrar of contractors of the California State
License Board in writing of any entered and unsatisfied judgments within 90
days from the date of judgment. Failure to provide such notification results in
automatic license suspension." Id. at 1262-63, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 762; see
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7071.6 (West 1995).
69. See Pac. Custom Pools, 79 Cal. App. 4th at 1263, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
762.
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. See id.
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license remained in an expired condition because they had presented
a dishonored check with the renewal application.
73
The contracting company's president submitted an affidavit
stating that he discovered the licensure suspension the very same
month in which the license was due to expire.74 After discovering
the licensure suspension, he attempted to contact the claimant and,
upon learning of the claimant's demise, contacted the claimant's suc-
cessor and reached an agreement for satisfaction of the remaining
debt.75 When proof of the satisfaction was submitted to the Califor-
nia State License Board, suspension of the contractor's license was
lifted.76 Based upon these facts the appellate court affirmed sum-
mary judgment for the defendants because the contractor "could not
establish that it 'acted reasonably and in good faith to maintain licen-
sure' or that it 'did not know or reasonably should not have known'
that it was not 'licensed.'0
7
Consequently, the legislature has only seemingly eliminated "re-
striction [of the substantial compliance doctrine] to 'inadvertent
clerical error,' as well as the issue of the contractor's negligence, in
favor of a standard based on the contractor's reasonableness and
good faith."78 Additionally, the legislature expanded application of
the exception to include situations in which "the contractor's prior
licensure may have been at an undefined prior time rather than the
more restrictive '90 days immediately preceding' the subject con-
tract."
79
73. See id.
74. See id. at 1262, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 761.
75. See id. at 1263, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 762.
76. See id.
77. Id. at 1265, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 764.
78. GIBBS & HUNT, supra note 3, at 27.
79. Id.
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IV. A MODEST PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE STATUTORY SUBSTANTIAL
COMPLIANCE TO RECAPTURE THE ESSENCE OF EQUITY AND FAIRNESS
WHICH CHARACTERIZED JUDICIAL SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE
The courts have construed and applied the Contractors' License
Law mindful of two conflicting policies:
On one hand, the license law should be strictly enforced in
order to protect consumers from abuse by unqualified con-
tractors. On the other, strict enforcement may prevent an
innocent, though technically unlicensed, contractor from re-
covering compensation for satisfactory work to the unjust
enrichment of a conniving owner.
80
The judiciary and legislature have sought to find the appropriate bal-
ance between these two competing interests within the parameters of
the substantial compliance doctrine.
The problem with the doctrine, in its current form, is that there
has been a failure to reach an appropriate balance between these in-
terests. The current substantial compliance doctrine was introduced
to alleviate the overly harsh application of the Contractors' State Li-
cense Law, yet the doctrine is unnecessarily restrictive in advancing
the interests that section 7031 was designed to protect.8 For in-
stance, even if a contractor "acted reasonably and in good faith to
maintain proper licensure and.., did not know or reasonably should
not have known that he or she was not duly licensed,' 82 it does not
necessarily follow that the public policies and legislative intent
which prompted the enactment of section 7031 were advanced.
Likewise, it is logically fallacious to believe that a failure to act
80. JAMEs ACRET, CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION LAW MANUAL 164 (4th ed.
1990).
81. For example, in West Coast Transfer Service Inc. v. Tutor-Saliba-
Perin, J.V, LASC No. BC 143376 (2000), expiration of the contractor's li-
cense near completion of the contract did not pose a threat to public safety or
threaten the possibility that the owner had received incompetent services.
Moreover, the contractor was bonded at all times during performance of the
contract which provided the owner with a source of recovery for defective and
shoddy work which may have resulted from a contractor's unlicensed status.
Under the current formulation of substantial compliance, these considerations
are not accounted for although they bear upon the very reasons for the exis-
tence of section 7031.
82. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7031(d) (West 1995).
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reasonably and in good faith to maintain proper licensure means that
the public policies and legislative intent underlying section 7031 are
not met. It is not necessarily true that an unlicensed contractor does
not possess the requisite knowledge to perform contractor services
competently, or that a licensed contractor is rendered incompetent
upon a negligent lapse of his or her license.
A legislative formulation of substantial compliance may not be
able to provide for consideration of all facts relevant in determining
whether the public interests of section 7031 have been violated and
whether the conduct of the contractor in renewing a lapsed license
can reasonably be called "substantial compliance." The judiciary, on
the other hand, provides an appropriate forum for consideration of all
relevant factors weighing in on the issue of substantial compliance.
Accordingly, statutory substantial compliance should be eliminated
in favor of judicial substantial compliance. This measure would en-
sure that the public policies underlying section 7031 are satisfied and
overly harsh applications of section 7031 are avoided.
The current legislative formulation defining substantial compli-
ance is inadequate because the elements comprising substantial com-
pliance do not guarantee that the public policies of section 7031 will
be satisfied. Specifically, the public policies underlying section 7031
are not advanced when a contractor who negligently allowed his or
her license to expire is precluded from bringing (1) a suit for recov-
ery or (2) a suit for fraudulent inducement against a property owner
for whom services were rendered. To achieve better alignment be-
tween the substantial compliance exception and the public policies
which support the contractors' licensing law, the legislature should
relinquish its hand in dictating to the courts when application of the
substantial compliance doctrine is appropriate rather than continually
tinkering with the statutory language of the exception.
A. The 1995 Amendment to Section 7031 Has Not
Alleviated the Unjust Consequences of Strict
Adherence Under the 1991 Amendment
The substantial compliance provision of section 7031 was
amended in 1995 to avoid the unjust results of the substantial com-
pliance doctrine under the 1991 amendment. The legislature's intent
has not been realized, however, because under both versions of the
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statute substantial compliance can only be established if a contractor
is able to prove that he or she was not negligent in maintaining his or
her license.8 3 Accordingly, under the 1991 version of section 7031, a
contractor could only establish substantial compliance with the licen-
sure law if he or she could prove that the "noncompliance with the
licensure requirement was a result of inadvertent clerical error or
other error or delay not caused by the person's negligence."
84
In Construction Financial,8 5 decided under the 1991 amend-
ment, the trial court's finding that the subcontractor's failure to have
a valid license due to its negligence was, by itself, enough to support
the dismissal. 86 The plaintiff contractor argued that "when the Leg-
islature amended section 7031 (d) in 1991, it could not have intended
to disqualify from application of the substantial compliance doctrine
every contractor who was unlicensed owing to negligence as ordi-
narily defined in tort law."87 "[T]he consequences of acting as a
contractor without being licensed are so severe that any person of or-
dinary prudence would use extraordinary care to assure that he or
she was licensed before undertaking work requiring a contractor's
license." 88 This is likely because "even extremely minor lapses of
diligence in maintaining licensure would be 'negligent' under ordi-
nary negligence standards." 89 Ultimately, the court refused to find
application of substantial compliance in circumstances involving
even "excusable neglect" and found that ordinary negligence would
83. In West Coast, the court found that the contractor had not substantially
complied with either the 1991 or 1995 amendments due to its negligence in
failing to renew its license and permitting the license to expire. Reporters
Transcript of Proceedings, April 19, 2000, pages 54-56.
84. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7031(d) (West, WESTLAW through 1992
statutes annotated-historical).
85. 53 Cal. App. 4th 170, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 574 (1997).
86. For a fuller discussion of the facts in Construction Financial, see supra
section III. C.
87. Constr. Fin., LLC v. Perlite Plastering Co., 53 Cal. App. 4th 170, 181,
61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 574, 580 (1997). Tort law defines "negligence" as "the failure
to use ordinary or reasonable care" or "that care which persons of ordinary
prudence would use in order to avoid injury to themselves or others under cir-
cumstances similar to those shown by the evidence." Id. at 181-82, 61 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 580.
88. Id. at 182, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 581 (emphasis in original).
89. Id.
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preclude invocation and application of the substantial compliance
doctrine.
Similarly, substantial compliance could only be satisfied under
the 1995 version if the contractor established that he or she "acted
reasonably and in good faith to maintain proper licensure, and did
not know or reasonably should not have known that he or she was
not duly licensed."90 In Pacific Custom Pools, dismissal was af-
fimned because the contractor could not establish that it acted rea-
sonably and in good faith to maintain licensure or that it did not
know or reasonably should not have known that it was not licensed.9'
Although it appears as if the legislature "eliminated the restric-
tion to 'inadvertent clerical error,' as well as the issue of the con-
tractor's negligence," 92 this conclusion is questionable in light of the
new standard based upon the contractor's reasonableness and good
faith in maintaining its license. The cornerstone of both the 1991
and 1995 standards is the contractor's "reasonableness," which, in
tort law, is the factual determination required to find negligence.
Furthermore, whether the 1995 amendment really removes "inad-
vertent clerical error" from the substantial compliance equation is
also disputable because the legislature clearly intended to "remove
the overly harsh application of the Contractors' State License Law
which... denies contractors payment for services rendered, when for
clerical or otherwise minor errors, they become unlicensed during
the term of the contract."
93
Consequently, although the legislature intended to expand the
scope of substantial compliance under the 1995 amendment, the ap-
plication of substantial compliance under the 1995 amendment is not
distinguished from that under the 1991 amendment. Case law con-
struing and applying substantial compliance under both versions of
section 703 1(d) supports this observation.
94
90. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7031(d) OVest 1995).
91. See Pac. Custom Pools, Inc. v. Turner Constr. Co., 79 Cal. App. 4th
1254, 1265, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 756, 764 (2000). For a fuller discussion of the
facts in Pacific Custom Pools, see supra section HI. D.
92. GIBBS & HUNT, supra note 3, at 27.
93. Senate Rules Committee Report for 1993 Senate Bill No. 1844, 1993-
94 Regular Session (Aug. 18, 1994) (emphasis added).
94. In dictum, the trial court in West Coast went out of its way to find that
the contractor did not substantially comply with the contractors' license law
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B. The Public Policies Supporting Section 7031 Are Not Advanced
When a Contractor Who Has Negligently Maintained His or Her
License Is Denied Compensation
Section 7031 precludes a contractor from recovering compensa-
tion when the contractor did not act reasonably or in good faith to
maintain proper licensure or knew, or reasonably should have
known, that he or she was not licensed.95 However, the nexus be-
tween promoting safety and competence in the construction industry
and precluding contractors who negligently allowed their licenses to
lapse is tenuous. It does not follow that a greater degree of compe-
tence, quality of workmanship, and overall safety will be achieved by
barring those who negligently allow their contractors' licenses to
lapse from enforcing their contractual right to payment. Arguably,
the threat of payment preclusion provides contractors with an incen-
tive to obtain and maintain their license in good standing. Assuming
this is true, a contractor's license still does not guarantee competence
or quality workmanship. Likewise, the negligent lapse of a contrac-
tor's license does not necessarily mean that services rendered are in-
competent or substandard. For example, no safety concerns are pre-
sented to either the contractor's clients or society in general when a
contractor has negligently allowed his license to lapse because the
contractor has already demonstrated the knowledge and skill required
to become licensed.
Moreover, if the purpose of section 7031 is to protect the public
from fraudulent contractors,96 then the statute should really only
under either the 1991 or 1995 amendment due to the contractor's own "active"
negligence. See Reporters Transcript of Proceedings, April 19, 2000, pages
54-56. A comparison of the courts' application of substantial compliance in
Construction Financial and Pacific Custom Pools reveals the marginal distinc-
tion, if any, between the 1991 and 1995 versions of substantial compliance.
Compare Constr. Fin., 53 Cal. App. 4th at 182, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 581 (noting
that the legislature only intended to create "an extremely narrow exception to
the licensure requirement, which would apply only where a contractor was
without a license owing to circumstances truly beyond his control"), with Pac.
Custom Pools, 79 Cal. App. 4th at 1265, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 764 (holding that
plaintiff was precluded from recovery because it could not establish that 'it
acted reasonably and in good faith to maintain licensure' or that it 'did not
know or reasonably should not have known' that it was not 'licensed"').
95. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7031(d) (West 1995).
96. See Sickels, supra note 16, at 298 (stating that the purpose of the Con-
tractors' License Law was to afford the public effective and practical protec-
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preclude contractors who intentionally, knowingly, or with a high
degree of recklessness, allow their licenses to expire. The punish-
ment imposed by section 7031 in barring compensation to contrac-
tors who have merely suffered a negligent lapse of their license
sweeps too broadly, sanctioning those who were merely negligent in
maintaining their licenses. This is an unjust and unfortunate result
considering that the legislature intended to preclude compensation to
those who acted, or failed to act, with a more culpable mental state to
prevent and discourage fraud in the construction industry.
The expiration of a license due to negligence does not, in and of
itself, render a contractor incompetent, or his or her work unsafe, and
the sanction imposed by section 7031 exacts a heavy price for negli-
gence in the process of deterring those who fraudulently hold them-
selves out as licensed contractors. Consequently, precluding a con-
tractor who has inadvertently, and perhaps negligently, allowed his
or her license to expire from recovering compensation for services
does not advance the legislative intent underlying section 7031.
C. The Public Policies of Section 7031 Are Not Advanced When a
Contractor Who Negligently Maintained His or Her License Is Not
Permitted to Maintain an Action for Fraud
"An unlicensed contractor cannot recover compensation for
construction work by alleging and proving fraud in the inducement
of the construction contract."97 The foregoing public policies are not
advanced when a contractor is not permitted to maintain an action for
fraud in the inducement although he or she was merely negligent in
allowing his or her license to lapse.
Prior to 1989, "[a] favorite avenue for recovery [for unlicensed
contractors] has been to allege promissory fraud, or fraud in the in-
ducement of the contract. By alleging that the owner, at the time
when the contract was formed, did not intend to fulfill its promise to
pay for work to be performed by the contractor, contractors sought to
overcome the nonlicensure defense."
98
tion against the unlawful and fraudulent acts of building contractors).
97. AcR, supra note 25, at 227.
98. See JAMES ACRET, CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION LAW MANUAL 54 (4th
ed. 1990 & Supp. 1995).
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In Pickens v. American Mortgage Exchange,99 the court held
that even an unlicensed contractor could file suit for fraudulent in-
ducement. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant represented to the
plaintiff that the property on which the contractor was to perform
services was "encumbered only to the extent of $30,000, when, in
fact, there was an additional encumbrance, a second deed of trust in
the sum of $25,000, and in reliance on these representations" plain-
tiffs performed services and furnished materials to the worksite. As
a result of plaintiffs reliance on the defendant's misrepresentations
in deciding to execute their contract, the court held that even though
the plaintiffs
could not recover on the contract, nor for the breach of it,
nor for the value of the work or for monies expended
therein, the fact that [the plaintiffs] were unlicensed did not
bar them from the prosecution of their cause of action for
fraud by which they were induced to enter the contract.1
00
After 1989, however, this avenue of recovery was eliminated.
In Hydrotech Systems, Ltd. v. Oasis Waterpark,10 1 the court rejected
Hydrotech's argument that it was induced to enter into the contract
by a promise the defendant did not intend to keep, that it would not
have entered into the contract but for the false promise to pay, and,
consequently, that the plaintiff was not seeking compensation for
unlicensed work, but instead was seeking damages for fraud. The
court held that an "unlicensed contractor may not circumvent the
clear provisions and purposes of section 7031 simply by alleging that
when the illegal contract was made, the other party had no intention
of performing."'
10 2
Although promissory fraud was frequently asserted to get
around the licensure defense and unlicensed contractors were recov-
ering unpaid sums in spite of the licensure law's purpose to protect
property owners from incompetence and fraud by unlicensed con-
tractors, it is unlikely that the legislature intended to extend these
protections to property owners who fraudulently induce unlicensed
contractors to perform services. The Contractors State License
99. 269 Cal. App. 2d 299, 74 Cal. Rptr. 788 (1969).
100. Id. at 303, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 792.
101. 52 Cal. 3d 988, 803 P.2d 370, 277 Cal. Rptr. 517 (1991).
102. Id. at 998, 803 P.2d at 376, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 523.
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Board's manual entitled What You Should Know Before You Hire a
Contractor clearly states that the licensure law is "designed to pro-
tect the consumer."' 0 3 This manual also informs the consumer about
the risks inherent in doing business with an unlicensed contractor.
10
Accordingly, a property owner who fraudulently induces an unli-
censed contractor into an agreement, not only intends to contract
with the unlicensed contractor, and assumes any and all risks of in-
competent or shoddy workmanship, but also arguably fails to fall
within the category of persons the licensure law was designed to
protect.
Not only does preclusion of a contractor's claim for fraud en-
courage property owners to engage in fraud by allowing them to
benefit from their own fraud, but it also enables one party with un-
clean hands to become unjustly enriched at the hands of the law.
Consequently, property owners who fraudulently induce unlicensed
contractors to perform contractor services should not be able to seek
protection under the licensure law after they have perpetrated a fraud
on the contractor and, upon entering a contract with an unlicensed
contractor, have willfully refused the protections offered under sec-
tion 7031.
V. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of judicial substantial compliance was conceived
over fifty years ago to avoid the harsh penalty of noncompensation
imposed under strict adherence to the contractors' licensing law.'05
The legislature's elimination of this equitable doctrine in 1989 and
the subsequent enactment of several measures to reinvent the excep-
tion have imposed an unjustifiable and unreasonable burden upon
contractors who inadvertently allow their licenses to expire. The
103. CONTRACTORS STATE LICENSE BOARD, WHAT YOU SHOULD KNow
BEFORE You HIRE A CONTRACTOR 13 (5th ed. 1995).
104. "Unlicensed contractors are a danger to your financial affairs because
they expose you to significant financial harm in the event of injury or property
damage. Few unlicensed contractors have adequate bonding or insurance." Id.
105. Gatti v. Highland Park Builders, 27 Cal. 2d 687, 166 P.2d 265 (1946)
(holding that strict adherence to the licensing law would work a manifestly
unjust and unequitable result on a contractor who had not violated the legisla-
tive intent of the licensing law and that strict enforcement "would become an
unwarranted shield for the avoidance of a just obligation").
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penalty of noncompensation for violating the contractors' licensing
law is not only inappropriate considering the gravity of the offense,
but it also fails to advance the public policies supporting the con-
tractors' licensing law. Although the legislature has acted to curtail
the harsh and restrictive application of the contractors' licensing law
in recent years by continually amending the statutory language of the
substantial compliance exception, this method of remedying the se-
vere consequences caused by an overly restrictive application of the
substantial compliance doctrine inadequately addresses the funda-
mental unfairness imposed on contractors. Accordingly, the judici-
ary should, once again, be entrusted with the fair and just application
of the contractors' licensing law and the substantial compliance ex-
ception so that the public policies underlying the licensing law, as
well as those which prompted the birth of a substantial compliance
exception, are satisfied.
The concern that a return to judicial substantial compliance will
result in uncertainty and inconsistency to the extent that judicial
"'substantial compliance' can have different meanings to different
persons and there is great difficulty in anticipating when substantial
compliance might be found"'' 0 6 is overstated in light of the efficient,
effective, and equitable application of the substantial compliance
doctrine under the three-pronged test established by Latipac.17 This
three-pronged test established a certain legal standard to determine
whether judicial substantial compliance had been satisfied and it was
this standard which was the "focal point in resolving questions of
claims by unlicensed contractors from 1966 to 1985. '  Unlike the
current statutory scheme, the Latipac court introduced a test for ap-
plying the substantial compliance doctrine which was better aligned
with the policies supporting the contractors' license law. For exam-
ple, the guidelines introduced in Latipac did not bar a class of per-
sons from compensation-i.e., those who negligently maintained
106. Moss, supra note 6, at 49.
107. Latipac, Inc. v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 278, 281-82, 411 P.2d 564,
567, 49 Cal. Rptr. 676, 679 (1966) (establishing that the contractor must hold a
valid license at the time of contracting, a renewal of the license must be readily
secured, and the responsibility and competence of the contractor's managing
officer must be officially confirmed throughout performance of the contract).
108. Moss, supra note 6, at 51.
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their licenses-which was not contemplated by the legislature in the
enactment of section 7031.
Additionally, the concern that reinstatement of judicial substan-
tial compliance will result in the liberalization of the doctrine to the
point that the public policies underlying the contractors' licensing
law will no longer be achieved is also exaggerated. Just as the appli-
cation of the judicial substantial compliance doctrine under Latipac
and its progeny was limited to circumstances in which the court
found no violation of the public policies supporting the contractors'
licensing law, this limitation can be reestablished and followed once
again.
Alternatively, it is the current form of the statutory substantial
compliance exception which does not advance the public policies
underlying the contractors' licensing law. The contractors' licensing
law was designed to punish fraudulent contractors; not contractors
who inadvertently make errors on their license renewal applications
or otherwise negligently fail to renew their licenses.' 09 It is unlikely
that a negligent lapse of a contractor's license would undermine the
public policy of promoting competence and deterring fraud, just as a
negligent licensure lapse does not, in and of itself, render a contrac-
tor incompetent or untrustworthy. The current statutory scheme does
not advance the legislative intent of the contractors' licensing law
and works a fundamental injustice against contractors who have
negligently allowed their licenses to lapse. Accordingly, a return to
judicial substantial compliance is preferable to the current statutory
substantial compliance exception to section 7031.
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